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NOTES AND COMMENT

something more than a mere contractual right concerning land has
been created, for it is difficult to see how a subsequent purchaser of
the land can be held liable on a contract to which he was not a party
and the obligations of which he has not assumed, unless it may be said
that in buying the land he impliedly assumes the contract. It would
seem, however, in the latter event that the more logical explanation
is that an interest in the land itself has actually been created, and
that the purchaser with notice takes subject to such interest.
JOHN L. CONNERS.

THE EXTENT OF A HUSBAND'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT His WIFE.

As a necessary incident to the marital relation there is imposed

on the husband the duty to support and maintain his wife and family
in conformity with his condition and station in life.' This duty does
not rest on any contractual rights but is based on considerations of
public policy 2 which demand that the husband, as the legal head of
the family,3 fulfill his obligation to those who are naturally dependent
upon him for support and protection. Today, most of the states have
strengthened this common law obligation by statute,4 imposing both

'Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351, 354 (1868); De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 229 N. Y.
255, 128 N. E. 117 (1920); Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal. 288, 200 Pac. 364 (1921);
Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 Pac. 259 (1923); State v. Kelly, 100

Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95 (1924); Thompson v. Thompson, 86 Fla. 515, 98 So.
589 (1923); Forrester v. Forrester, 155 Ga. 722, 118 S. E. 373 (1923); Lyons
v. Schanbacher, 316 IlL. 569, 147 N. E. 440 (1914); Davis v. Davis, 208 Ky.
605, 271 S. W. 659 (1925); Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N. E. 875
(1923); I~n re Wood's Estate, 288 Mo. 588, 232 S. W. 671 (1921) ; Knecht v.
Knecht, 261 Pa. 410, 104 Atl. 676 (1918); State v. Bagwell, 125 S. C. 401,
118 S. E. 767 (1923); Clifton v. Clifton, 83 W. Va. 149, 98 S. E. 72 (1919);
Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 196 N. W. 783 (1924) ; (1924) 24 HARv.
L. REv.
306.
2
1n re Ryan's Estate, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820 (1907); In re Simonson's Estate, 164 Wis. 590, 160 N. W. 1040 (1916).
'Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17 (1883); Blaechenska v. Howard Mission,
130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755 (1892).
'VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAmILY LAWS (1935) 48: "The statutes of the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, and Minnesota merely
state that the husband shall be liable for necessaries furnished the wife or
contracted by the wife. By implication South Carolina and Texas reach the
same result by providing that the husband shall not be liable for the debts of
the wife, except those contracted for her necessary support. California, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota
all provide that if the husband does not make adequate support for the wife a
third person in good faith may supply her with necessaries and recover the
reasonable value thereof from the husband. * * * Fifty-one jurisdictions now
impose by means of abandonment, desertion, and non-support statutes a criminal
or quasi-criminal liability upon the husband who under certain circumstances
breaches such duty."
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civil and criminal liability on delinquent husbands.
statutes are in accord with the majority.5

The New York

It must be borne in mind that the husband's duty to support his
wife is not an unconditional one but is predicated on her willingness
to abide by her marital vows and to contribute equally to their domestic felicity. 6 However, since the obligation of a husband to support
his wife continues until dissolved or modified by a judgment of separation or divorce, irrespective of her actual fault, he may be prosecuted as a disorderly person under the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure, 7 where the wife is or is about to become an object of public
charity.8 Thus it appears that in any event the husband is not absolved from his duty to support until he has secured judicial sanction,
and since the court action involved is particularly odious, it is apparent
that his position is most disadvantageous. At one time it was thought
that the Married Women's Acts and subsequent legislation which relieved wives of their common law disabilities and established an almost
perfect legal parity between husband and wife also relieved the husband of his common law obligation to support his wife. The courts,
' N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 589, § 914: Who May Be Conpelled to Support Poor
Relatives: "The husband, wife, * * * of a recipient of public relief or of a
person liable to become in need of public relief shall, if of sufficient ability, be
responsible for the support of such person. * * * If such poor person be insane,
he shall be maintained in the manner prescribed by the insanity law. The * * *
husband, wife * * * of a poor insane person legally committed to and confined
in an institution supported in whole or in part by the state, shall be liable, if of
sufficient ability, for the support and maintenance of such insane person from
the time of his reception in such institution."
N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 899, subd. 1: "The following are disorderly
persons: Persons who actually abandon their wives or children, without adequate
support, or leave them in danger of becoming a burden upon the public, or who
neglect to provide for them according to their means."
See In re Schiffrin's Estate, 152 Misc. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1934),
wherein it was decided that the word "abandon" in Section 899 merely addressed
itself to the question of whether or not a person within its description has
failed to fulfill the other obligation of support which the law imposes on him.
' Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141, 129 N. E. 349 (1921); Wirth v.
Wirth, 184 App. Div. 643, 172 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dept. 1918) ; Reardon v.
Reardon, 210 Ala. 129, 97 So. 138 (1923); Sholes v. Sholes, 72 Colo. 175,
209 Pac. 1046 (1922); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 177 Mo. 469, 119 S. W. 489

(1909)

("Mere failure to keep house properly does not relieve the husband

of his duty.").
' N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 899, subd. 1; see note 5, mtpra.
8People v. Schenkel, 258 N. Y. 224, 226, 179 N. E. 474, 476 (1932) ("Duty
of provision is absolute and regardless of the wife's fault. The public interest,
in the opinion of the legislature, requires that the husband, not the taxpayer,
shall bear the burden of her support as long as the relationship of husband and
wife is not altered or dissolved by decree of court."); People v. Jonsen, 264
N. Y. 364, 365, 191 N. E. 17, 18 (1934) ("Where a judgment of separation has
been granted to the husband for her wilfull abandonment, he may not be
prosecuted for failure and neglect to support her.").
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however, were quick to deny such relief 9 and promptly extended a
protective arm 10 to the wife.
To ascertain the degree of support, or, what is commonly called
the necessaries,to which a wife is legally entitled, one must look to the
economic status of the husband." Necessaries, as applied to a wife,
are not confined to those articles of food and clothing which are required to sustain life and preserve decency, but include such articles
of utility as are suitable to maintain her according to the estate and
degree of her husband. 12 Accordingly, wearing apparel,13 medical attendance,14 reasonable dentistry, 15 household supplies,' 6 furniture,' 7 a
gold watch and certain jewelry 18 have been held to be necessaries. 19
By the weight of authority in this country, however, legal expenses in
suits for divorce have been held not to be necessaries. 20 As was said
by the Connecticut court: "The duty of providing necessaries for the
wife is strictly marital, and is imposed by the common law in reference only to a state of coverture, and not of divorce. By that law a
'Holcomb v. Harris, 166 N. Y. 257, 59 N. E. 820 (1901); Grandy v.
Hadcock, 85 App. Div. 173, 83 N. Y. Supp. 90 (3d Dept. 1903); Ruhl v.
Heintz, 97 App. Div. 442, 446, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1031, 1033 (2d Dept. 1904) ("A
statute authorizing a married woman to contract does not abrogate the common
law liability of the husband to support her.").
"0Davis v. Davis, 65 Cal. 499, 244 Pac. 478 (1926); Poole v. People, 24
Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025 (1898) (nor is he relieved from liability because the
wife has adequate means of her own, or a separate estate) ; State v. Hill, 161
Iowa 279, 142 N. W. 231 (1913); Ribb. v. Flenniken, 32 S. C. 189, 10 S. E.
943 (1899) ; Israel v. Silsbee, 57 Wis. 222, 15 N. W. 144 (1883).
Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N. J.Eq. 715, 120 Atl. 790 (1923).
'Wilder v. Brokaw, 141 App. Div. 811, 126 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dept.
1910); Wickstrum v. Peck, 163 App. Div. 608, 148 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st
Dept. 1914).
"Hardenbrook v. Harrison, 11 Colo. 9, 17 Pac. 72 (1888) ; Fitzmaurice v.
Buck, 77 Conn. 390, 59 Atl. 415 (1924); Feiner v. Boynton, 73 N. J.L. 136,
62 At1. 420 (1906).
"'Schneider v. Rosenbaum, 52 Misc. 142, 101 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1906);
Thrall Hospital v. Caren, 140 App. Div. 171, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1038 (2d Dept.
1910); In re Babcock, 185 App. Div. 906, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1078 (4th Dept.
1918).
'Clark v. Tenneson, 146 Wis. 65, 130 N. W. 895 (1911).
"Fischer v. Brady, 47 Misc. 401, 94 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1905); Perkins v.
Morgan, 36 Colo. 360, 85 Pac. 640 (1906).
g Jordan Marsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N. E. 350 (1922). But
see Caldwell v. Blanchard, 191 Mass. 489, 77 N. E. 1036 (1906) (as to purchase
by wife on her own credit).
' Cooper v. Haseltine, 50 Ind. 400, 98 N. E. 437 (1912) ; Johnson v. Briscoe,
104 Mo. 493, 79 S.W. 498 (1904).
"Elder v. Rosenwasser, 238 N. Y. 427, 144 N. E. 669 (1924) (Legal services rendered in successfully defending a married woman against a criminal
prosecution may be necessaries). See Porter v. Briggs, 38 Iowa 166 (1878)
(Protection of a wife's character in a suit against -her by employing counsel is
as much a necessary as food, etc. within the rule requiring one to provide his
wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life).
'Sumner v. Mohn, 47 Cal. 142, 190 Pac. 368 (1920) ; Meaher v. Mitchell,
112 Me. 416, 92 Atl. 492 (1914) ; Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 201 Pac.
314 (1921); Zent v. Sullivan, 47 Wash. 315, 91 Pac. 1088 (1907); Clarke v.
Burke, 65 Wis. 359, 27 N. W. 22 (1886).
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valid contract of marriage was and is indissoluble, and therefore by it
the husband could never have been placed under obligation to provide for the expenses of its dissolution." 21
It must not be supposed that the wife or a jury determine the
standard upon which the husband shall support his wife. A husband
must support his family according to his station in life but he always
retains a wide latitude of discretion as to how much of his income it
is advisable to spend and is entitled to dictate the manner in which the
money shall be spent. 22 Thus it has been held that the purchase of a
gold watch upon her husband's credit could not be based upon an
agency by necessity merely by proving that the women of her neighborhood, of her social and economic standing, generally had gold
watches.23 The husband may, to a great extent, lose his discretionary
powers where he abandons his wife or gives her cause to live apart
from him 24 since the jury, in an action for support and maintenance

must, of necessity, judge objectively.
II.
Assuming that the husband is remiss in furnishing needful support, and apart from criminal liability, 25 how may the wife assert her
legal rights? The common law doctrine makes the ground of the
husband's liability for his wife's necessaries that of agency. This
agency is stated as an agency of necessity where a deserving wife
stands in want of supplies because of her husband's misconduct, but
since at common law the wife could possess no property and was
legally dependent upon her husband it is obvious that the agency of
necessity was a legal fiction indulged in by the courts to protect the
wife's position. Disregarding the disability of the wife to contract and
disregarding the fiction of "marital unity", the common law did not
disable the wife from entering into a contract as the agent of her husband where he had given her express authority2 6to bind him, or had
impliedly held her out as having such authority.
'Shelton

v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 423 (1885).

In Lanyon's Detective

Agency v. Cochrane, 240 N. Y. 274, 148 N. E. 520 (1925), the New York Court

of Appeals held that a wife suing her husband for separation could not employ,
upon her husband's credit, a detective to discover his infidelities, unless such
services were actually necessary to protect her or to obtain a decree of separation which would give her support.
Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N. J.Eq. 715, 120 Atl. 790 (1923).
'Johnson v. Briscoe, 104 Mo. 493, 79 N. W. 498 (1924).
"Kirk v. Chinstrand, 85 Minn. 108, 88 N. W. 422 (1901).
- Where a husband is prosecuted under CODE OF CRIM. PROc. § 899, subd. 1,
he may be compelled to pay a sum of money sufficient only to keep his wife
from becoming an object of charity. The sum awarded is not commensurate

with the amount the husband can afford to pay, as in an action for separation

or support and maintenance.
'Frank v. Carter, 219 N. Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549 (1916) (Though the mar-

riage is bigamous and void, the husband may be liable if he places the "wife"
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As has been said above, the articles or services for which a wife
is allowed to pledge her husband's credit as his presumed agent are
designated at common law as necessaries. There is a broad presumption of assent to the agency which cohabitation, of itself, furnishes.
The simple circumstance that husband and wife are living together
has been generally held sufficient, when nothing to the contrary intervenes, to raise a presumption that the wife is rightfully making such
purchases of necessaries as she may deem proper.27 Whoever then
supplies her in good faith, as the law has usually been understood,
need inquire no further, but may send the bill to her husband, for it
is not to be supposed that a husband will go in person to buy every
little article of dress or household provision which may be necessary
for his family. As Lord Abinger observed, "A wife would be of little
use to her husband in their domestic arrangements if his interference
was always deemed to be necessary." 28 Accordingly, if an action is
brought against the husband for the price of goods or services furnished under such circumstances, it must be taken prima facie that
those goods were supplied by his authority, and he must show either
that he is not responsible or that the materials purchased were not
necessaries. 29 This presumption, however, is one of fact and not of
law. Cohabitation does not conclusively, but only prima facie, empower the wife to render her husband liable, even for those things
which are suitable for the household in question. He may rebut this
presumption by showing that she was properly supplied and was not
in charge of his household). See Stevens v. Hush, 172 N. Y. Supp. 258
(1918) (Where a husband authorizes his wife as his agent to purchase household
furniture on credit, and in doing so it was necessary that she contract with the
mortgagee to insure the property, the making of such agreement was within the
scope of her authority) ; James McCreery & Co. v. Martin, 84 N. J. L. 626,
87 Atl. 433 (1913) (Where a husband authorized his wife to hire necessary
board and lodging for herself and family, the husband is bound as if he
personally made the contract).
Bradt v. Shull, 46 App. Div. 347, 61 N. Y. Supp. 484 (2d Dept. 1899);
Dixon v. Chapman, 51 App. Div. 542, 67 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1st Dept. 1900);
Baccaria v. Landers, 84 Misc. 396, 146 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1914); Graham v.
Schleimer, 28 Misc. 535, 59 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1899) ; Geiger v. Blockley, 86
Va. 329, 10 S. E. 43 (1889) (The implied power of a wife to bind her husband
for necessaries, where it exists, is for her own benefit, and not for the benefit
of those with whom she may deal) ; Zent v. Sullivan, 47 Wash. 315, 91 Pac.
1088 (1907).
' Emmet v. Norton, 8 Car. & P. 506, 509 (1844).
'Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135 (1903) (If the
husband has fully fulfilled his duties, his wife has no power to pledge his
credit, and a merchant or other third person deals with her at his peril, unless
the husband has given his wife implied authority to act as his agent) ; May v.

Josias, 159 N. Y. Supp. 820 (1916) (That the husband is not liable "upon any
contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility" of
course does not apply to a contract made by a wife as agent, or on his credit

for necessaries) ; Watts v. Moffet, 12 Ind. 399, 40 N. E. 533 (1895) ; Steinfield
v. Gerrard, 103 Me. 151, 68 Atl. 630 (1907); Noel v. O'Neil, 128 Me. 202,
97 Atl. 513 (1916) ; Howell v. Blesh, 19 Okla. 260, 91 Pac. 893 (1907).
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authorized to pledge his credit.80 And since his liability, where he
suitably maintains her, is based on the theory of an agency in fact,
the tradesman's ignorance of the fact that the wife had been forbidden
to pledge his credit is altogether immaterial, provided of course, the
husband has not so held out his wife as authorized to pledge his credit
as to be estopped to deny her agency.3 ' The existence of the marital
relationship and the household do not create an appearance of agency
such as will conclusively estop the husband from denying it to the
prejudice of one who has acted upon the appearance. There is no
such universal custom for wives to pledge their husband's credit as
to justify such a rule of law. But the custom is sufficiently prevalent
to justify a presumption that it exists in any particular case, until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming, and hence to place
upon the
husband the burden of proof of its nonexistence in fact.82
It should be noted that the word "necessaries" as has been heretofore discussed refers merely to those goods suitable to the household,
not absolute necessaries; for in the latter case there is a liability by
the husband regardless of actual authority. Where a husband neglects
to provide for or to support his wife, even if they are cohabiting, the
wife has an absolute right to pledge his credit for necessaries. She has
' Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351 (1868); Wickstrum v. Peck, 155 App.
Div. 523, 140 N. Y. Supp. 570 (2d Dept. 1913) (A shopkeeper, who has notice
that the husband claimed to be providing for his wife, and had forbidden credit,
sells to the wife on the credit of the husband at the risk of being able to show
that the husband failed to perform his duty, and that the goods furnished were
actually necessary for the then present or immediate future use of the wife) ;
B. Altman & Co. v. Durland, 185 App. Div. 114, 173 N. Y. Supp. 62 (3d
Dept. 1918).
'Debenham v. Mellon, 5 Q. B. 403 (1878) ("If a man and his wife live
together, it matters not what private arrangements they make, the wife has all
the usual authority of wife," applies only to the case where an appearance of
authority has been created by the husband's acts or by his assent to the acts of
his wife).
"Per Thesiger, L. J., in Debenham v. Mellon, 5 Q. B. at 405 (1878) : "It
is contended that there is a presumption that a wife living with her husband is
authorized to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries; that the goods supplied by the plaintiffs were, as it is admitted they were, necessaries; and that,
as a consequence, an implied authority is established. This contention is founded
upon an erroneous view of what is meant by the term 'presumption' in cases
where it has been used with reference to a wife's authority to pledge her
husband's credit for necessaries. There is a presumption that she has such
authority in the sense that a tradesman supplying her with necessaries upon her
husband's credit, and suing him, makes out a prima facie case against him upon
proof of that fact and of the cohabitation. But this is a mere presumption of
fact, founded upon the supposition that wives cohabiting with their husbands
ordinarily have authority to manage in their own way certain departments of
the household expenditure, and to pledge their husband's credit in respect to
matters coming within those departments. Such a presumption or prima facie
case is rebuttable and is rebutted when it is proved in the particular case, as
here, that the wife has not that authority. If this were not so, the principles
of agency, upon which, ex hypothesi, the liability of the husband is founded,
would be practically of no effect."
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this right although no agency in fact exists, for the agency is implied
in law without regard for the fact.38

III.
Thus far we have given consideration only to those instances
where the wife's agency could be inferred from the fact of cohabitation. Where a wife is living apart from her husband, there is no
presumption that she has any authority in fact to pledge his credit,
even for necessaries.3 4 On the contrary, the presumption is that she
has no such authority. The person who sells to her under such circumstances either sells to her as a femme sole, or, if he knows that
she is married, he is given reason to suspect from the fact of her living
apart from her husband that her relations with him are such that she
has not been authorized to pledge his credit. Thus it is incumbent
upon the tradesman, in order to hold the husband liable, to rebut the
presumption by showing authority in fact or else to bring the case
within the rule of an agency by necessity, giving the wife an absolute
power to bind her husband where he neglects to provide for her.3 5
The rule referred to applies all the more forcibly, if possible, where
the husband unlawfully separates from his wife without making suitable provision for her, or if he, by his conduct, causes her to leave
him.3 6 A husband is bound to support his wife, and if he leaves her
without the means of subsistence she becomes "an agent of necessity
to supply her wants upon his credit." 3 This right arises where the
husband has driven the wife away, or where she has left him in consequence of ill treatment and reasonable apprehension of further vio'Keller

v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351 (1868); W. & J. Sloane v. Boyer, 95

N. Y. Supp. 531 (1905) ; Beigh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 30 N. W. 77 (1886);

Dorrance v. Dorrance, 257 Mo. 317, 165 S.W. 783 (1914).
'Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 278 N. Y. 380, 16 N. E. (2d) 373
(1938) (A wife who uses her own money to pay household expenses, or while
living apart from her husband, to pay for her own support, may seek reimbursement from her husband only where he has promised such reimbursement
either expressly or by implication of law); Hass v. Brady, 49 Misc. 235,
96 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1906) ; Annis v. Manthey, 234 Mich. 347, 208 N. W. 453
(1926) (Where a husband and wife are living apart, it devolves upon a physician giving credit to the wife for medical services to show that the wife was
not at fault, or that the husband authorized or assented to the performance of
the services).
Sturbridge v. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 35 N. E. 669 (1893); Vusler v.
Cox, 53 N. J.L. 516, 22 Atl. 347 (1891).
'Wolf v. Schulman, 45 Misc. 418, 90 N. Y. Supp. 363 (1904); Sultan v.
Misralu, 47 Misc. 655, 94 N. Y. Supp. 519 (1905); Wisnom v. McCarthy, 48
Cal. 697, 192 Pac. 337 (1920); State v. Newman, 91 Conn. 6, 98 Atl. 346
(1916); Clothier v. Sigli, 73 N. J.L. 419, 63 Atl. 865 (1906); Mihalcoe v.
Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921).
'Eastland v. Burchell, 3 Q. B. 436 (1877) ; cf. Charles M. Decker & Bros.
v. Moyer, 121 N. Y. Supp. 630 (1900); Harrigan v. Cahill, 100 Misc. 48,
164 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (1917).
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lence,8 8 or because her husband has rendered his home an unfit place
for, her to live in, as by introducing women of profligate habits, 89 or
in consequence of the commission by him of such acts as would entitle
her to a divorce. 40 If the wife leaves her husband without justifiable
41
cause, she forfeits the right to obtain her necessaries at his expense.
In case she returns and is received by her husband the right revives,
offers
but only as to future necessaries, 42 this
48 being true where she
to return and he refuses to accept her.
It is when the husband and wife separate by mutual agreement
that difficulty is encountered in reconciling the authorities with regard
to the power of the wife to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries.
The early cases are generally agreed that under such circumstances
the husband's liability for necessaries furnished her continues in the
absence of any provision for her support. 44 It also continues where
he has agreed to make her an allowance, if he does not pay it. 45 When,
however, he furnishes her with an adequate allowance, she cannot
IBaker v. Orighton, 130 Iowa 35, 106 N. W. 272 (1906) ; In re Newman's
Case, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359 (1916) ; Beaudette v. Martin, 133 Me. 310,
93 AtI. 758 (1915).
"Descelles v. Kachmus, 8 Iowa 51 (1848).
'Rea v. Durkee, 25 Ill. 503 (1834).
'Constable v. Rosener, 178 N. Y. 587, 70 N. E. 1097 (1904); Elder v.
Rosenwasser, 238 N. Y. 427, 144 N. E. 669 (1924); Johnson v. Coleman, 13
Ala. 520, 69 So. 318 .(1915) ; Kessler v. Kessler, 2 Cal. 509, 83 Pac. 257 (1905) ;
Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, 60 Colo. 290, 152 Pac. 903 (1915) ; State v.
Newman, 91 Conn. 6, 98 Atl. 346 (1916); Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226,
116 Atl. 451 (1922); Audrain County v. Muir, 297 Mo. 499, 249 S. W. 383
(1923) (holding that.the tradesman's ignorance of the separation did not affect
the rule); Belknap v. Stewart, 38 Neb. 304, 51 N. W. 881 (1892) ; Walker v.
Laighton, 31 N. H. 111, 113 (1876) ("The husband who has causelessly deserted
his wife .may in good faith seek a reconciliation, and if the wife, under such
circumstances, refuses to live with him again, without good cause, she becomes
from that time the party in the wrong, and has no longer any authority to
pledge his credit, even for necessaries, more than she would have had if she
had herself originally left him without cause. * * * And it makes no difference
that he desires her to change her residence, and to go live with him at some
other place, not unsuitable for her residence, since he has the right to choose
his own residence, and it is the duty of the wife and children to conform to
his wishes in this respect.") ; Morgenroth v. Spencer, 124 Wis. 564, 102 N. W.
1086 (1905).
" Reese v. Chilton, 26 Mo. 598 (1858).
' 3 McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281 (N. Y. 1814); McGayhay v.
Williams, 12 Johns. 293 (N. Y. 1815).
"Lockwood v. Thomas, 12 Johns. 248 (N. Y. 1815); Kimball v. Keyes,
11 Wend. 33 (N. Y. 1833) ; McKee v. Cunningham, 2 Cal. 684, 84 Pac. 260
(1906); McCarter v. McCarter, 10 Ga. 754, 74 S. E. 308 (1912) ; In re Newman's Case, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359 (1915).
'Nurse v. Craig, 2 Bos. & P. 148 (1832), wherein the husband, to defeat
liability for necessaries furnished his wife for support of herself and her
children, on the ground of an agreement with the wife whereby such necessaries
were to be purchased with an amount given the wife weekly, was required to
show that the wife had been furnished with sufficient money to pay cash for
all such necessaries.
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bind him 46 and the fact that the person who furnishes her with goods
has no knowledge of the allowance is immaterial, for in supplying her
he acts at his peril. 47 The allowance must be sufficient for the wife's
necessaries, and whether it is so or not is a question of fact for the
jury,48 except where she agrees to accept a stipulated allowance and
not to apply to her husband for more. In that case the question of
sufficiency is not for the jury, since it is excluded by the express
terms of the settlement. 49 The difficulty referred to was inspired by
a recent New York case, Rochester General Hospital v. Ingstrum, 0
which held that the plaintiff could not recover from the husband for
services rendered to the wife who was separated from the husband by
mutual consent. The court assented to the view that the services rendered by the plaintiff were necessary to the health of the defendant's
wife, but based its judgment on the ground that there was no legal
justification for the separation. In other words, the court frowns on
separation by consent insofar as it permits the wife the privileges of
the "agency by necessity" doctrine. The court further found that
credit was extended solely to the wife and that at no time was the
plaintiff aware of the husband's existence. It is obvious that if the
court had ruled against the plaintiff on the strength of this last finding,
there could be no criticism of the decision; but such is not the case.
It is clearly emphasized that a wife may not leave her husband even
with his consent, justifiably, so as to make him liable for her necessary expenditures. No reason is assigned for this departure from
the earlier cases. The ruling appears to be arbitrary and unsound.
Conclusion.
From the foregoing analysis of the husband's obligation to support his wife, it would appear that the law was and continues to be
"Baker v. Barney, 8 Johns. 72 (N. Y. 1811).
7

' lbid.

Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227 (1858).
"Eastland v. Burchell, 3 Q. B. 432 (1877) ("The authority of a wife to
pledge the credit of her husband is a delegated, not an inherent authority. If
she binds him, she binds him only as his agent. This is a well established
doctrine. If she leaves him without cause and without consent, she carries no
implied authority with her to mainfain herself at his expense. But if he
wrongfully compels her to leave his home, he is bound to maintain her elsewhere, and if he makes no adequate provision for this purpose she becomes an
agent of necessity to supply her wants upon his credit. In such a case, inasmuch
as she is entitled to a provision suitable to her husband's means and position,
the sufficiency of any allowance whi-h he makes under those circumstances is
necessarily a question for the jury. Where, however, the parties separate by
mutual consent, they may make their own terms; and so long as they continue
the separation these terms are binding upon both. Where the terms are, as in
this case, that the wife shall receive a specified income for maintenance and
shall not apply to the husband for more, how can any authority to claim more
be implied? It is excluded by the express terms of the arrangement.").
' Rochester General Hospital v. Ingstrum, 164 Misc. 148, 298 N. Y. Supp.
603 (1937).
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most zealous in its protection of the wife's marital rights. The husband may be compelled to answer not only to his wife, but to the
state, 51 and even to total strangers 52 where he is remiss in the performance of his legal obligations. The Ingstrum decision, however,
may be significant of a new attitude which the courts will adopt in
their jurisdiction over "non-support" cases. If sustained, the case may
influence further judicial opinion to the extent that third-party actions
against the husband will be curtailed entirely. The thought that the
husband is entitled to choose the persons with whom his wife has
pledged his credit is not without merit and is appealing to one's sense
of justice and fair dealing. It would seem more appropriate that the
wife secure a judicial separation wherein her maintenance is provided
for, rather than be permitted to pledge indiscriminately her husband's
credit with persons who, very conceivably, he might object to.
Strangers who deal with a wife should do so on her own credit, or if
she is believed to be financially irresponsible, should not extend credit
at all. It should be noted that this new application of the law would
be valid only in those instances where the spouses have separated by
consent. There is no doubt as to the right of an abandoned spouse
to pledge her husband's credit. We do not believe that the legislature would sanction a proposal to abolish third-party actions against
the husband, but it is not entirely improbable that courts will by the
weight of judicial decree relieve the husband of this not infrequent
nuisance.
RAYMOND J. MARGLES.

STATUTORY LIMITATION FOR FRAUD ACTIONS.

One of the outstanding problems that confront us in a consideration of the Statute of Limitations may be stated thus: Does the
statutory period in actions founded in fraud run from the time of
the perpetration of the fraud or the discovery thereof?'
The New York Legislature had apparently solved this problem
by the clear and unmistakable wording of Section 48, subdivision 5,
of the New York Civil Practice Act.2 The decision in Brick v. Cohn'See
'See

note 7, supra.
note 27, supra.

IBALLANTINE,

LIMITATIONS

(1829)

86 n.1; BANNING,

LImITATION OF

AcriONs (3d ed. 1906) 2; Troup v. Smith Ex'rs, 20 Johns. 43 (N. Y. 1822) ;
Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30 (N. Y. 1830) ; First Mass. Turnpike Corp. v.
Field, 3 Mass. 201 (1807).
'N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 48, subd. 5, "The following actions must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued: * * * Any action
to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud. The cause of action in such
a case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff, or the
person under whom he claims, of the facts constituting the fraud." (This
section will hereafter be referred to as the fraud Statute of Limitations.)

